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CASE NOTE

REEVALUATING GALAVIZ V. BERG: AN ANALYSIS OF FORUMSELECTION PROVISIONS IN UNILATERALLY ADOPTED
CORPORATE BYLAWS AS REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS

B ONNIE W HITE

†

I NTRODUCTION
In the wake of a passing comment and footnote in In re Revlon, Inc.
1
Shareholders Litigation, Delaware practitioners have grappled with the
enforceability of forum-selection provisions adopted in corporate
charters and bylaws. After the Delaware Chancery Court decided In re
Revlon in 2010, most practitioners concluded that such a provision
would be enforceable under Delaware corporate law. However in
2011, in Galaviz v. Berg—a case of first impression—the Northern District of California rejected the contention in In re Revlon that forumselection provisions adopted by Delaware corporations should be con2
tractually enforceable. The court in Galaviz instead held that a forum-selection provision contained in a bylaw unilaterally adopted by a
board of directors was not binding on shareholders under federal
3
procedural law governing forum-selection provisions. Still, given the
uncertainty regarding the enforceability of forum-selection provisions
†

Senior Editor, Volume 161, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate,
2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2010, Boston University.
1
990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010).
2
See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174-75 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Under these
circumstances, there is no basis for the Court to disregard the plaintiffs’ choice of
forum . . . .”).
3
Id.
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in other jurisdictions, many practitioners continue to advise compa4
nies to adopt these provisions “just in case.” Galaviz is likely not the
last word on the enforceability of forum-selection provisions in charters and bylaws. Depending on the contract analysis a federal court
accepts, some courts may find forum-selection provisions contractually
binding on shareholders while others, like the court in Galaviz, will
5
not. The impact of Galaviz hinges on whether other courts choose to
invalidate forum-selection clauses contained in bylaws, in which case
corporations will need to find other ways to respond to costly shareholder litigation, or whether courts will reject the Galaviz contract
analysis, enabling boards of directors to rely on the enforceability of
the forum-selection provisions they adopt.
I argue in this Case Note that in spite of the Galaviz decision, under federal procedural law governing the enforceability of such provisions, forum-selection provisions in bylaws that are unilaterally
adopted by a board of directors should be contractually binding on
shareholders. In Part I, I describe the typical content of charters and
bylaws of Delaware corporations, as well as the ways by which charters
and bylaws can be amended, asking preliminarily whether amendments to charters and bylaws are contractually binding under Dela4

See, e.g., Stephen LaSala, Risk Management Techniques for Today’s M&A Transactions
(“[D]elaware corporations, particularly those that are publicly traded, should consider
the adoption of a forum-selection bylaw.”), in A DVISING C LIENTS IN M ERGERS AND
A CQUISITIONS , 2011 ED ., L EADING L AWYERS ON U NDERSTANDING R ECENT L EGAL
D EVELOPMENTS , H ANDLING C ROSS -B ORDER M AND A D EALS , AND N AVIGATING
THE C URRENT E CONOMIC C LIMATE 10 (2011).
5
See Brian v. Breheny et al., Skadden 2011 Insights: Global M&A (“It would not be
surprising to see additional stockholder challenges testing the validity of such ‘choice
of forum’ provisions in Delaware and other courts in 2011.”), in P RACTISING L AW
I NSTITUTE , G LOBAL C APITAL M ARKETS & THE U.S. S ECURITIES L AWS 2011:
S TRATEGIES FOR THE C HANGING R EGULATORY E NVIRONMENT 299, 308 (2011);
LaSala, supra note 4, at 9 (“[C]ompanies should be advised that such clauses are a relatively new phenomenon, and their enforceability remains uncertain.”); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34
D EL . J. C ORP. L. 57, 134 (2009) (“Even where they passed muster in a shareholder
vote, the provisions would be tested by plaintiffs in litigation beyond Delaware. One
state’s conclusion about the enforceability of the charter forum restriction would not
be binding on another.”); Charles M. Nathan, New Challenges and Strategies for Designating Delaware as Jurisdiction for Corporate Disputes, H ARV. L. S CH . F. ON C ORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 11, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/
05/11/new-challenges-and-strategies-for-designating-delaware-as-jurisdiction-for-corporatedisputes (“[Galaviz] is not the last word on the subject and additional cases will be
needed to test the viability of exclusive jurisdiction bylaws before we know whether
shareholder approval is required and whether exclusive jurisdiction provisions will be
enforced by jurisdictions other than Delaware . . . .”).
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ware law. In Part II, I present the current state of the law on forumselection provisions in contracts, and then examine the kinds of forum-selection provisions that have recently been incorporated into
corporate charters and bylaws. In Part III, I describe Vice Chancellor
Laster’s dicta in In re Revlon, which set the stage for the California district court’s contract analysis in Galaviz v. Berg, presented in Part IV.
Finally, in Part V, I analyze the board of directors–shareholder relationship in terms of a requirements contract, and conclude that forum-selection provisions should be enforceable under federal
procedural law governing such provisions.
I. C HARTERS AND B YLAWS
Before evaluating the contractual enforceability of provisions contained in charters and bylaws, it is necessary to understand what relationships these documents govern and how the documents can be
amended under Delaware corporate law. The primary governing
document of any corporation is the corporate charter, sometimes referred to as the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation or Certificate
of Incorporation. Under Delaware law, the charter must set forth the
name and address of the corporation, the nature of the business to be
conducted, and any preferred stock the corporation intends to issue
6
in addition to its common stock. The charter may also contain a provision conferring upon the board of directors the power to adopt,
7
amend, and repeal bylaws.
Bylaws are the secondary governing documents of a corporation.
Bylaws delineate “the rules and regulations or private laws enacted by
the corporation to regulate, govern and control its own actions, affairs
and concerns and its shareholders or members and its directors and
officers with relation to each other and among themselves in their re8
lation to the corporation.” Bylaws “may contain any provision, not
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating
to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors,
9
10
officers or employees.” Bylaws are, unlike shareholder resolutions,
6

D EL . C ODE A NN . tit. 8, § 102(a)(1)–(4) (2011).
Id. § 109(a).
8
W ILLIAM M EADE F LETCHER , F LETCHER C YCLOPEDIA OF THE L AW OF
C ORPORATIONS § 4166, at 655 (Carol A. Jones ed., 2010).
9
Tit. 8, § 109(b).
10
See Edward D. Herlihy, Takeover Law and Practice 2009 (“A board of directors has
no legal obligation under state or federal law to accept or act upon precatory share7
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binding on a board of directors, although subsidiary to any provisions
included in the charter.
A. Are Charters Contracts?
A charter defines the relationship between the board of directors
and the shareholders in a corporation. However, the manner by
which charters (and bylaws) may be amended is a function of the cor11
porate law of the state in which a corporation is incorporated. Further, the procedures by which charters (and bylaws) are amended may
or may not comport with the requirements of contract law. In Delaware, provisions find their way into a charter in one of two ways: (1) a
12
provision may be placed in a charter at the time of incorporation, or
(2) a provision may be incorporated into the charter upon the adoption of a resolution by the board of directors and a majority vote of
13
Because a charter amendment requires both a
the shareholders.
resolution by the board of directors and a shareholder vote, charters
have more “contractual force” than bylaws, which is why “variations
from the conventional model of corporate governance” are usually
14
included in charters rather than bylaws. Still, even where rights are
15
delineated in a charter, those rights differ from contractual rights.
holder proposals that receive the vote of a majority of the outstanding shares
entitled to vote.”), in P RACTISING L AW I NST., C ONTESTS FOR C ORPORATE
C ONTROL 2010: C URRENT O FFENSIVE AND D EFENSIVE S TRATEGIES IN M&A
T RANSACTIONS 339, 365 (2010).
11
See infra notes 13, 16-18, and accompanying text.
12
Tit. 8, § 102.
13
Id. § 242(b)(1); see also Steven M. Davidoff, A Litigation Plan That Would Favor Delaware, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 26, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2010/10/26/a-litigation-plan-that-would-favor-delaware (suggesting that including a
provision in a charter at the time of incorporation is easier than submitting a resolution to a shareholder vote).
14
G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. R EV. 517, 542
n.166 (1989); see also L ATHAM & WATKINS LLP, C ORPORATE G OVERNANCE C OMMENTARY: D ESIGNATING D ELAWARE ’ S C OURT OF C HANCERY AS THE E XCLUSIVE
J URISDICTION FOR I NTRA -C ORPORATE D ISPUTES : A N EW “M UST ” FOR D ELAWARE
C OMPANY C HARTER OR B YLAWS 1 (2010), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/
pubContent/_pdf/pub3510_1.pdf (“Subject to the complications of a shareholder
approval process, amending a company’s charter to include a forum selection provision is generally preferable to amending its bylaws.”).
15
See Jennifer B. Poppe & Alithea Z. Sullivan, Could the Supreme Court’s Enforcement of
Arbitration in Concepcion Reverberate in the Securities Litigation Sphere?, S EC . L ITIG . R EP.,
Sept. 2011, at 1, 3 (“The most obvious distinction between contractual and shareholder
rights is that only the latter may be altered without consent . . . . [E]ven when a majority vote by shareholders is required, dissenting shareholders have far less recourse than
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B. Are Bylaws Contracts?
Under Delaware law, bylaws may be adopted in one of three ways.
First, initial incorporators may unilaterally adopt, amend, or repeal
16
bylaws before stock in the corporation has been sold. Second, after
stock has been sold, stockholders entitled to vote may adopt, amend,
17
or repeal bylaws by majority vote. Finally, as noted above, a charter
may authorize a board of directors to unilaterally adopt, amend, and
repeal bylaws without shareholder vote, subject to the limitation that
this power “shall not divest the stockholders or members of the power,
18
nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.” This third
19
option is available to most, but not all, corporations.
Subject to Section 109(b)’s limitation on appropriate subjects for
20
bylaws, Delaware law considers bylaws adopted by any of these methods to be binding on both the board of directors and the sharehold21
While “bylaws are often described as a contract among the
ers.
22
members of a corporation,” the analysis in Delaware centers not on
whether the method by which a bylaw is adopted creates a contractually
binding relationship between the board of directors and shareholders,
a party to a conventional contract.”); Stevelman, supra note 5, at 132 (explaining that
“consent” is conceptualized differently in corporate law than in contract law, since in
corporate law consent means “a vote of the majority of shares is binding on the rest”).
But see S AMUEL C. T HOMPSON , J R ., M ERGERS , A CQUISITIONS AND T ENDER O FFERS :
L AWS AND S TRATEGIES § 5:2.8 (2011) (emphasizing that forum-selection provisions
affect only intra-company litigation, in which both parties involved in the litigation are
parties to the board of directors–shareholder relationship).
16
See tit. 8, § 109(a).
17
Id.
18
Id.; see also Frederick H. Alexander & Daniel D. Matthews, The Multi-Jurisdictional
Stockholder Litigation Problem and the Forum Selection Solution, BNA’ S C ORP. C OUNSEL
W KLY., May 11, 2011, at 2, 3 (“Assuming the corporation’s charter authorizes its board
to amend the bylaws, the board can adopt such a provision without stockholder action.
The stockholders would, however, retain the unilateral authority to amend the bylaws.”
(citations omitted)).
19
See R. F RANKLIN B ALOTTI & J ESSE A. F INKELSTEIN , T HE D ELAWARE L AW OF
C ORPORATIONS AND B USINESS O RGANIZATIONS Form 1.5 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he
Board of Directors of the corporation is expressly authorized to make, alter and repeal
the bylaws of the corporation, subject to the power of the stockholders of the corporation to alter or repeal any by-law whether adopted by them or otherwise.”); Stevelman,
supra note 5, at 132 (noting that it “is often the case” that a charter grants a board of
directors the power to unilaterally amend bylaws).
20
See tit. 8, § 109(b).
21
See L ATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that because Delaware
law is “deferential to corporate judgment,” the Court of Chancery typically
“presumes that corporate bylaw and charter provisions . . . are valid and should be
specifically enforced”).
22
See F LETCHER , supra note 8, § 4166, at 653.
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but instead on whether the method by which a bylaw is adopted is authorized under state law. Practitioners’ documents frequently warn
23
against reading literally courts’ contract-analysis language.
II. F ORUM -S ELECTION P ROVISIONS
Provisions specifying the forum in which a dispute among
contracting parties must be brought are common in commercial
contracts. They are, however, a recent phenomenon in the world of
corporate governance.
A. Forum-Selection Provisions in Contracts
Forum-selection provisions specify the forum where, in the event of
breach, a contracting party may file suit. Commercial agreements
often contain forum-selection clauses, including thirty-nine percent of
contracts appended to Form 8-Ks and roughly eighty-seven percent of
24
public company merger agreements. Since The Bremen v. Zapata Off25
Shore Company, forum-selection provisions in contracts are presump26
tively enforceable, provided that the choice of forum is reasonable.
In determining the enforceability of forum-selection clauses in contracts, federal courts consider, among other things, (1) “whether the
23

See id. § 4166, at 654 (noting that the “language of a contract used by the courts
should not mislead the practitioner into believing that courts will actually treat bylaws
exactly as they would a contract,” especially when bylaw provisions are contrary to state
law or when enforcement would cause “unreasonable hardship to the other shareholders”); see also 6 A M . B AR A SS ’ N S ECTION ON L ITIGATION , B USINESS AND
C OMMERCIAL L ITIGATION IN F EDERAL C OURTS § 72:19 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed.
2011) (describing Kirleis v. Dickie McCamey & Chilcote PC, 560 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2009),
which held that a shareholder must have explicitly assented to a bylaw provision requiring arbitration for that bylaw to apply to her, and noting that “the Third Circuit chose
not to apply the well-settled corporate principle that members of the corporation are
presumed to know and understand the corporation’s bylaws”).
24
See Joseph A. Grundfest, Stanford Law Sch. & The Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: Mandatory and
Elective Approaches, slide 2 (Oct. 6 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1690561 (describing the “demographics” of forum-selection clauses and the dramatic
recent increase in their usage).
25
407 U.S. 1 (1972) (analyzing the enforceability of a forum-selection clause in an
international towage contract).
26
See 14D C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT ET AL ., F EDERAL P RACTICE & P ROCEDURE
§ 3803.1, at 51-52 (3d ed. 2007) (“Today, the common understanding is that these
provisions are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown
to be unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular contract.”).
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challengers were aware of their potential liability,” (2) “whether the
challengers were experienced business people,” (3) “whether the forum-selection clause was hidden,” (4) “whether enforcement of the
forum-selection clause would deprive the challenger of his or her
‘day in court,’” and (5) “whether any related case was pending
27
in the selected forum.”
B. Forum-Selection Provisions in Charters and Bylaws
Forum-selection provisions appear in corporate charters and bylaws in two forms: mandatory provisions, which state that litigation
must be brought in the state of incorporation, and elective provisions,
which state that the corporation has the option to keep litigation in
the state of incorporation or to litigate a claim brought in another
28
state if it so elects. The law firm Latham and Watkins has suggested
that corporations adopt the following elective provision in their bylaws:
The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer of the Corporation to the
Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting
a claim against the Corporation arising pursuant to any provision of the
[Delaware General Corporation Law], or the Corporation’s Certificate of
Incorporation or Bylaws, or (iv) any action asserting a claim against the
29
Corporation governed by the internal affairs doctrine.

The circumstances enumerated in this model provision seek to apply
the forum-selection provision to all disputes between the board of di30
rectors and the shareholders.
27

See 1A F EDERAL P ROCEDURE , L AWYER ’ S E DITION § 1:697 (2002). But see
W RIGHT , supra note 26, § 3803.1, at 69 (“There is no requirement, beyond notice, that
the forum clause be the subject of bargaining.”).
28
See Davidoff, supra note 13 (explaining that forum-selection provisions in bylaws
can be phrased either “as a requirement that all shareholder litigation would occur in
the jurisdiction of incorporation or as an option for the corporation to elect that all
shareholder litigation would occur in the state of incorporation”); Grundfest,
supra note 24, at slide 6 (describing the difference between mandatory and
elective provisions).
29
L ATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 5. But see id. at 6, n.24 (“[W]e do
not recommend including a clause concerning deemed notice or consent, such as ‘Any
person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital
stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to the provisions of this Article . . . .’”).
30
See Alexander & Matthews, supra note 18, at 2 (describing the circumstances under which forum-selection provisions do and do not apply); see also L ATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 1 (explaining that forum-selection clauses are useful “for
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III. IN RE REVLON, INC. SHAREHOLDERS LITIGATION
In In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster
addressed the question of whether the lead counsel in a shareholder
action should be replaced for failing to advocate adequately on behalf
31
of its clients. The Vice Chancellor balanced the possibility that disqualification could incentivize law firms to provide more diligent representation against the likelihood that shareholders might respond to
such disqualifications by bringing suits outside of Delaware to avoid
32
the risk of having counsel removed. In dicta, Vice Chancellor Laster
commented that Delaware corporate law might permit corporations to
adopt forum-selection provisions in their charters:
Perhaps greater judicial oversight of frequent filers [of derivative suits]
will accelerate their efforts to populate their portfolios by filing in other
jurisdictions. If they do, and if boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and valuepromoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for
33
intra-entity disputes.

While the Vice Chancellor referred explicitly to forum-selection
34
provisions adopted in charters, the accompanying string cite carried
the implicit suggestion that forum-selection provisions could be
35
adopted in bylaws as well.
the resolution of all intra-corporate disputes including claims asserting breach of fiduciary duty or seeking, under state law, to overturn directors’ business judgments concerning matters ranging from the routine to potential M&A or other transformative
transactions”); Davidoff, supra note 13 (explaining that forum-selection provisions
would apply only to state law claims, and would not affect federal claims, such as SEC
enforcement actions).
31
990 A.2d 940, 942 (Del. Ch. 2010).
32
Id. at 960.
33
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
34
Id. at 960 n.8. The string cite included: D EL . C ODE A NN . tit. 8, § 102(b)(1)
(2011) (describing the limits of what kinds of provisions can be adopted in corporate
charters); Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999) (allowing
an LLC agreement to select arbitration as its exclusive forum for litigating disputes);
Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Del. Ch. 2006) (enforcing a provision in an LLC agreement requiring that all intra-entity disputes be
arbitrated); Stevelman, supra note 5, at 133-35 (arguing that forum selection provisions
contained in charters and bylaws should be enforced under Delaware law); Sara Lewis,
Note, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery”
Solution, 14 S TAN . J.L. B US . & F IN . 199 (2008) (same).
35
See A M . B AR A SS ’ N S ECTION ON L ITIGATION , supra note 23, § 72:19 (interpreting In re Revlon to mean that forum-selection provisions could be adopted not only in
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A. Why Keep Cases in Delaware?
When corporations adopt forum-selection provisions in their charters or bylaws, they generally do so to ensure that derivative suits are
brought in Delaware. Requiring that matters be decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery affects settlement value in derivative suits
36
both by providing increased certainty in outcomes and by eliminat37
ing the increased costs of litigating in multiple forums. Some practitioners, however, have argued that an “out-of-Delaware trend” has led
to the strategic filing of derivative suits in forums other than Delaware
38
Adopting a
in order to exploit the increased settlement value.
forum-selection provision in a corporation’s charter or bylaws is one
effective way to counteract strategic filings, a solution undoubtedly
endorsed by Vice Chancellor Laster in response to these concerns.

charters, but in all governance documents); see also Grundfest, supra note 24, at slide 19
(“Because forum-selection provisions both relate to shareholder power and limit
shareholder power, forum-selection provisions are appropriately included either
in the bylaws or charter.”).
36
See LaSala, supra note 4, at 9 (“A [] clause that requires a lawsuit to be resolved
by the Delaware Chancery Court takes advantage of Delaware’s well-developed body of
corporate case law, the court’s expertise in handling these types of cases, and its general reluctance to delay or enjoin transactions [which] can significantly limit [] uncertainty and cost . . . .”); L ATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that
the Delaware Chancery Court is the “nation’s preeminent forum” regarding precedent,
experience, focus, and quality, which makes interpretation and application of the law
more predictable); S KADDEN , A RPS , S LATE , M EAGHER & F LOM LLP & A FFILIATES ,
2011 I NSIGHTS 53 (2011) (arguing that settlement value is lowered in Delaware because “the Court of Chancery does not pose the risk of a jury trial or punitive damages
if the case proceeds past a preliminary injunction phase”); Lewis, supra note 34, at 20102 (suggesting that outcomes are more uncertain when other states apply their own
corporate laws in spite of the internal affairs doctrine, which would require application
of Delaware corporate law).
37
See L ATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14, at 2 (arguing that forum-selection
provisions prevent cases from being litigated in multiple forums at once, which reduces
litigation costs).
38
For example, during an acquisitions deal, shareholders of the target often bring
opportunistic suits for their settlement value, though these suits “rarely prevent deals
from going through.” See LaSala, supra note 4, at 9. These suits are considered an
unavoidable cost of doing a deal because there is relatively little a corporation can do
to prevent them. Forum-selection provisions, however, can decrease settlement value
by increasing certainty in outcomes. But see John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian
Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act 22-28 (Univ. of Cambridge Legal Stud. Res. Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 37/2011, 2011) (explaining that since 2001, cases have
been moving out of Delaware, but arguing that because other forums have always been
uncertain, the cause of the “out-of-Delaware” trend might be that Delaware judges have
become overly skeptical of the plaintiffs’ bar).
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B. Reaction to In re Revlon
Forum-selection provisions in charters and bylaws first surfaced in
the early 1990s, but between 1991 and 2010 only sixteen corporations
39
had such provisions in place. In 2010, significantly more corporations began adopting forum-selection provisions in their bylaws and
40
charters in response to Vice Chancellor Laster’s dicta in In re Revlon.
After the decision, at least twenty-three corporations adopted forum41
selection provisions. While Vice Chancellor Laster’s comment referred to provisions adopted in charters, most corporations responded
by adopting such provisions in their bylaws, because doing so does not
42
require a shareholder vote. As of May 2011, at least thirty-seven corporations had forum-selection provisions in their charters, and eleven
others included charter or bylaw proposals in proxy materials for their
43
2011 meetings. With the recent surge in the adoption of forumselection provisions in bylaws, practitioners have circulated memoran44
da speculating about whether these provisions will be enforceable.
39

See Davidoff, supra note 13 (describing the emerging trend of corporations
adopting forum-selection provisions); see also Grundfest, supra note 24, at slide 3
(demonstrating that from the In re Revlon decision to September 2010, this number
increased from sixteen to thirty-nine). There was also a period in 2006 during which
forum-selection provisions were added to bylaws, including Netlist, Inc.’s and Oracle
Corp.’s provisions, the subject of Galaviz. See Davidoff, supra note 13.
40
See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Such bylaws
are reportedly a recent phenomenon, apparently occasioned by a passing comment in
In re Revlon, Inc. . . .”); Grundfest, supra note 24, at slide 3 (terming the adoption of
forum-selection provisions the “Revlon effect”); Breheny, supra note 5, at 308 (“A number of prominent companies already have adopted such provisions.”); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay: Contractual Unconscionability, 96
I OWA L. R EV. 1177, 1229 (2011) (noting that “dozens” of corporations adopted forumselection provisions in their bylaws in response to In re Revlon); LaSala, supra note 4, at
9 (claiming that the adoption of forum-selection provisions is a “rapidly growing
trend,” and noting the connection to In re Revlon).
41
See Davidoff, supra note 13.
42
As explained in more detail below, Delaware Code Section 109(a)obviates the
need for a shareholder vote when the charter contains a provision authorizing the
board of directors to amend the bylaws unilaterally. See Alexander & Matthews,
supra note 18, at 3.
43
See Nathan, supra note 5.
44
See, e.g., Breheny, supra note 5, at 308 (discussing the Galaviz decision and the
possibility of future challenges to forum-selection provisions); Patrick E. Gibbs, Hot
Topics in Corporate Governance Litigation: Recent Developments in the Delaware Court of
Chancery (speculating about the effect of Vice Chancellor Laster’s dicta in In re Revlon),
in P RACTISING L AW I NSTITUTE , S ECURITIES L ITIGATION AND E NFORCEMENT
I NSTITUTE 2010, at 715 (2010); LaSala, supra note 4, at 9 (urging the adoption of
forum-selection provisions based on In re Revlon and in spite of Galaviz); Nathan, supra
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IV. GALAVIZ V. BERG
In 2011, the District Court for the Northern District of California
addressed—for the first time—whether a shareholder could bring a
breach of fiduciary duty claim in federal court despite a forumselection provision in the corporation’s bylaws requiring that deriva45
tive suits be brought in Delaware. The court in Galaviz v. Berg held
that, under federal procedural law applying contract principles
to forum-selection provisions, such a provision contained in a bylaw
that was unilaterally adopted by a board of directors was not
46
binding on shareholders.
Because Galaviz addressed a derivative suit that included a federal
cause of action, federal law, and not Delaware law, applied. In deciding the case under federal law, the Galaviz court implicitly accepted
the defendant’s argument that contract law was an appropriate lens
through which to examine the relationship between boards of direc47
The plaintiff-shareholders argued in their
tors and shareholders.
opposition to the defendant-board’s motion to dismiss that no contract existed between the shareholders and board of directors because
48
the shareholders did not consent to be bound by the provision. The
court found, in agreement with the plaintiffs, that bylaw provisions
adopted by a board of directors without a shareholder vote were not
contractually binding on shareholders, because the shareholders did

note 5 (predicting that Galaviz will not be the only response to the trend in Delaware
of adopting forum-selection provisions in bylaws).
45
Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (quoting Oracle’s forum-selection provision:
“The sole and exclusive forum for any actual or purported derivative action brought on
behalf of the Corporation shall be the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware”).
46
Id. at 1174-75.
47
The corporation cited the following for its argument that bylaws should be
treated as a contract between the board and the shareholders:
See, e.g., Stolow v. Greg Manning Auctions Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 236, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (relying on the contractual nature of bylaws to dismiss for lack
of standing a third party's claim that an association had failed to comply with its
own bylaws); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239 (Del.
2008) (characterizing a bylaw that shareholders proposed to adopt as an “internal governance contract,” and holding it to be an impermissible limitation
on directors' obligation to exercise certain fiduciary duties); see also Andrews
Farms v. Calcot, Ltd., 258 F.R.D. 640, 648 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“It is generally accepted that corporate bylaws are to be construed according to the general rules
governing the construction of statutes and contracts.”).
763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
48
See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Nominal Defendant Oracle’s Motion to Dismiss at 7,
Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 10-4233),
2011 WL 5189617.
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not assent to the terms of the bylaw.
The court reasoned that
“[u]nder contract law, a party’s consent to a written agreement may
serve as consent to all the terms therein, whether or not all of them
were specifically negotiated or even read, but it does not follow that a
contracting party may thereafter unilaterally add or modify
50
Thus, the court focused on the contractcontractual provisions.”
ually binding effect of bylaw amendment procedures authorized
under Delaware state law.
The importance of the Galaviz decision lies in its potential effect
on how practitioners should advise boards of directors seeking to
adopt forum-selection provisions in bylaws. If shareholders file federal
claims in the Northern District of California, then the court will follow
Galaviz and refuse to enforce a forum-selection provision adopted unilaterally by the board. But what if shareholders file in other districts?
If the consensus among federal courts is that forum-selection provisions in bylaws are unenforceable under contract principles, then a
board of directors will have to find some other way of addressing the
problems posed by shareholder suits brought in courts outside of Delaware. I argue in the next Part, however, that other federal courts
should not follow the Galaviz reasoning, and should instead find that
forum-selection provisions in corporate bylaws are contractually binding on shareholders. As a consequence, boards of directors should
continue to adopt these provisions as a response to shareholders who
strategically file suit outside of Delaware.

49

763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. The scope of this holding might be limited to instances
in which bylaws are adopted by the same board implicated in the wrongdoing that
forms the subject of the derivative suit and adopted after the alleged wrongdoing occurred. See id. at 1171 (suggesting that the holding in Galaviz is limited to the specific
facts of the case); Lasala, supra note 4, at 101 (explaining that the court might have
found the forum-selection provision enforceable if it had been adopted by a different
board); Adam M. Turteltaub, et al., California Court Rejects the Enforceability of a Delaware
Forum Selection Clause in Corporate Bylaws, M ETROPOLITAN C ORP. C OUNS ., Mar. 2011,
at 15 (“Had Oracle’s bylaws included a forum selection clause prior to any alleged
wrongdoing and/or the purchase of shares in Oracle by the plaintiffs, the district court
may have come to a different conclusion.”). However, the fact that a board must adopt
bylaws in good faith should not affect the contract analysis with respect to mutual assent, and thus supports the view that the Galaviz holding should not be so narrow.
50
Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.

White.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

402 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

5/9/2012 2:21 PM

[Vol. 160: 390

V. T HE B OARD OF D IRECTORS : S HAREHOLDER R ELATIONSHIP
AS A R EQUIREMENTS C ONTRACT
The court in Galaviz found that a forum-selection provision contained in a bylaw unilaterally adopted by a board of directors was not
binding on shareholders because the shareholders did not assent to
51
the provision. In so holding, the court conceptualized the contract
formed between the shareholders and board of directors at the time
the shareholders purchased stock as a static set of rights and obligations between the two parties, in which all terms were specified at the
time of assent. In this case, any amendment to the terms would create
a contract—in the case of a unilaterally adopted bylaw, this new contract would be invalid for lack of mutual assent. However, this analysis
fails to recognize that a corporate charter explicitly and intentionally
leaves some terms open by allowing shareholders and the board of
52
The
directors to unilaterally adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws.
Galaviz court noted that Oracle’s forum-selection provision was not
present in the “existing contract terms” at the time the plaintiff53
shareholders purchased stock. While this may be true, it is also the
case that the possibility of a forum-selection provision was “present
54
in the original agreement.”
Because the charter intentionally leaves some terms open, it is not
accurate to analyze the contract as a static picture of the state of the
corporate charter and bylaw amendments in place at the time an individual shareholder purchased her shares. The contract, instead, is an
exchange of all the rights afforded to shareholders as defined by the
charter and state corporate laws in consideration for the shares’ pur51

Id. at 1174.
See B ALOTTI & F INKELSTEIN , supra note 19, at Form 1.5 (“[T]he Board of Directors of the Corporation is expressly authorized to make, alter and repeal the by-laws of the
Corporation, subject to the powers of the stockholders of the Corporation to alter or
repeal any by-law whether adopted by them or otherwise.” (emphasis added)). Note
that shareholders also have the authority to adopt shareholders agreements without
the consent of the board of directors. See Gibbs, supra note 44, at 718 (“Corporate
charters and bylaws would seem to confer benefits on stockholders no less than corporate shareholders agreements confer benefits on directors; if nothing else, it would
seem that shareholders foresee being bound by them.”); Federal Courts Needn’t Honor
Delaware Venue-Choice Bylaw, Judge Says, 28 W ESTLAW J. C OMPUTER & I NTERNET 7, 7
(2011) (citing Professor Joseph Grundfest’s argument that even though directors are
typically the party to adopt forum-selection provisions in the bylaws, shareholders
could vote to amend the bylaws to choose a different forum or to repeal a
forum-selection provision).
53
Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
54
Id.
52
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chase price and an agreement to be bound by the corporate charter
and bylaws, incorporating the mutual understanding that the bylaws,
and in more limited circumstances the charter, are subject to adoption, amendment, and repeal. The shareholder, in purchasing her
shares, agrees to be bound by the corporate charter and the provisions
therein defining the relationship between the shareholder and the
55
board of directors. She agrees to be bound by the terms of the charter, including any provision that allows the board of directors to
amend the bylaws unilaterally, because she knows that the board is
confined by fiduciary duties and the shareholders’ ability to repeal or
amend any bylaw by majority vote.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-204, a contract
with open terms is valid if the contracting parties intend to be bound
56
by such terms and there is a reasonably certain basis for remedy.
When a shareholder purchases shares in a corporation, she clearly
intends to be bound by the corporate charter and bylaws and expects
the board likewise to be bound. In the case of a forum-selection provision, the certain basis for remedy is specific enforcement—in other
words, the dismissal of any suit brought outside of the forum specified.
Further, a shareholder’s agreement to be bound by a board’s subsequent unilateral adoption of a bylaw containing a forum-selection
provision is comparable to a requirements contract in which key terms
57
are left open in order to adapt to market fluctuations. Under U.C.C.
55

See Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (“[A]lthough the
by-laws are a contract between the corporation and its stockholders, the contract was
subject to the board’s power to amend the by-laws unilaterally.” (citations omitted)).
56
See U.C.C. § 2-204 (3) (2009) (“Even if one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”).
57
See Allen Blair, “You Don’t Have to Be Ludwig Wittgenstein”: How Llewellyn’s Concept
of Agreement Should Change the Law of Open-quantity Contracts, 37 S ETON H ALL L. R EV.
67, 75 (2006) (“Most of modern contract law, the law of open-quantity agreements
included, can be seen as developing from a need, arising in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, to address contingencies occasioned by new forms of commerce and industry.”); id. at 76 n.25 (“‘Large-scale production and expanding markets
create[d] greater uncertainties and more business hazards . . . .To meet [the demand
of more complex allocations of risk] many types of contracts have come into use containing various provisions for the fixing of terms with reference to future events.’”
(quoting Harold C. Havighurst & Signey M. Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts,
27 I LL . L. R EV. 1, 1 (1932) (first alteration in original))).
The law of requirements contracts provides special insight into the relationship between a board of directors and shareholders for two reasons. The first is that a board
of directors is constrained by its fiduciary duties to shareholders such that even when a
board of directors unilaterally acts to amend bylaws or makes other business judg-
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§ 2-306, a contract is valid even when a quantity of goods is not specified, so long as the actual goods the purchaser ends up requiring in
good faith from the seller turn out to be reasonable in light of what
58
the parties estimated from prior dealings. In the “contract” between
the board of directors and a shareholder, the unspecified terms include all of the bylaws that a board of directors might unilaterally

ments, it must do so in good faith and with the best interests of the shareholders in
mind. Compare Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (explaining that the duty
of good faith is a component of a board of directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty), with
Shelley Smith, A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quantity
Contracts: Reforming the Law of Exclusivity and Good Faith, 43 VAL . U. L. R EV. 871, 877
(2009) (noting that requirements contracts allow a buyer to reduce his requirements
to zero only if he does so in good faith), and id. (explaining that the duty of good faith
eliminates the need for requirements contracts to be exclusive and provides a gauge
for when a requirements contract has been breached). Nevertheless, a board of directors must make business decisions in response to changing conditions in the corporate
market and therefore requires the discretion to react to conditions unanticipated by
the parties upon the formation of the shareholder-board relationship. Compare
D EL C ODE A NN . tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors . . . .”), R. F RANKLIN B ALOTTI & J ESSE A. F INKELSTEIN , T HE D ELAWARE
L AW OF C ORPORATIONS & B USINESS O RGANIZATIONS § 4.16[D], at 4-146 (3d ed.)
(Supp. 2011) (describing the duties of an independent board of directors, which include seeking advice on fluctuating market conditions in the industry), and D. Gordon
Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 F ORDHAM L. R EV. 125, 174
(2011) (“In a system in which private ordering is encouraged, corporate bylaws,
through experience and adaptation, become solutions to common governance problems faced by corporations.”), with W ILLIAM D. H AWKLAND , 1 U NIFORM
C OMMERCIAL C ODE S ERIES § 2-306:1 (explaining that requirements contracts allow
parties to adapt to the problem of over- and underproduction when needs change in a
fluctuating market), and S. Smith, supra, at 883 (identifying changes in consumer preferences, advances in technology, and market fluctuations as factors affecting the terms
in a requirements contract). Second, a provision in the charter granting the board of
directors authority to amend the bylaws without a shareholder vote reflects an “allocation of discretion,” which is reflected in the price paid by the shareholder for her
shares. Compare D. G. Smith et al., supra, at 128 (proposing reforms that would allow
shareholders to amend bylaws more easily in order to “produce more diversity and
experimentation in corporate governance” in response to changing market conditions), with Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining
in Good Faith, 35 U.C. D AVIS L. R EV. 319, 327 (2002) (illustrating that in a requirements contract, one party’s “freedom to alter the quantity taken [is] typically circumscribed to take into account [the other party’s] reliance,” and that one party’s freedom
to alter terms allows the other party to negotiate for more consideration).
58
See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1) (“A term which measures the quantity by the output of the
seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as
may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any
stated estimate . . . or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be
tendered . . . .”); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949)
(recognizing the enforceability of requirements contracts under federal law, although
suggesting that some requirements contracts may be anticompetitive).
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adopt after a shareholder has purchased her shares, subject to the
mandate that all such bylaws be free of language designed to deprive
59
The
shareholders of their power to adopt bylaws of their own.
U.C.C. confines these terms by imposing two requirements: the terms,
once specified by one of the parties (the board of directors), must be
made in good faith (in compliance with the directors’ fiduciary
60
duties), and the terms must be in reasonable accordance with the
61
estimations of the other party (the shareholder).
Thus, the following question emerges: could shareholders reasonably foresee a board of directors unilaterally adopting a forumselection provision in the corporation’s bylaws? The answer is not
entirely clear. On one hand, a charter provision explicitly authorizing
the board of directors to adopt a forum-selection provision in the bylaws would alert a reasonable shareholder to the possibility that the
board could identify Delaware as the sole forum for derivative suits. It
is less obvious, however, that a broader charter provision, authorizing
a board to adopt bylaws in general, alerts shareholders to the possibility of the board adopting a bylaw containing a forum-selection provision. Still, a shareholder ought to foresee that a board with the
authority to amend bylaws unilaterally might determine that keeping
litigation in Delaware is in the best interests of the corporation.
This argument—that the basis of a contract between a shareholder
and corporation is the shareholder’s assent to the charter provision
empowering the board of directors to amend the corporation’s bylaws—responds to Sara Lewis’s argument in her Note Transforming the
62
“Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution.
Addressing whether shareholders have a vested interest in their ability
to bring suits in forums other than Delaware, Lewis focuses on whether
a bylaw provision is binding in terms of notice. Shareholders who
purchase shares after the bylaws are amended lack actual notice but
have constructive notice of the additional bylaw. Even absent actual
notice, purchasing in an “open and developed market” means that a
63
shareholder bought “at a price that reflected the clause’s value.”
59

See supra text accompanying note 18.
See Goldberg, supra note 57, at 324 (emphasizing the need for “devices for
constraining discretion”).
61
U.C.C. § 2-306 (1).
62
Lewis, supra note 34.
63
See Lewis, supra note 34, at 211; see also L ATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 14,
at 3 (arguing that shareholders do not have a vested interest in litigating claims outside
of Delaware because shareholders are aware of the possibility of bylaw amendments).
60
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While notice of an amendment certainly is not the same as assent
64
to it, Lewis’s argument emphasizes the fundamental fairness in binding shareholders to subsequent bylaws. For shareholders not wishing
to be bound by future bylaws, a share in a corporation that lacks such
a charter provision would be more valuable. It is particularly fair for
board-adopted bylaws to bind shareholders because shareholders have
at least two protections from undesirable amendments: they can
65
either repeal the bylaw with a majority vote, or can bring a derivative
suit for breach of fiduciary duty if the adoption of a bylaw would not
be protected as a valid business judgment. Further, a shareholder
may, in an open market, sell her shares in exchange for shares in a
corporation without such a forum-selection provision. While this is
not a contract remedy, since selling one’s shares would not provide
restitution damages to compensate for fluctuations in the market
price of the share between the time of purchase and sale, it does suggest that shareholders can “vote with their feet” to affect the availability of certain bylaw provisions, such as forum-selection provisions, in
the Delaware corporate market. When shareholders assent to the
terms of a charter providing that shareholders will be bound by future
bylaws adopted by the board, shareholders should be contractually
bound by such provisions in board-adopted bylaws.
C ONCLUSION
The Galaviz holding that forum-selection provisions in bylaws unilaterally adopted by a board of directors do not bind shareholders
under federal procedural law governing forum-selection provisions is
just one possible response to Vice Chancellor Laster’s dicta in In re
Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. As this Note argues, shareholders
should be bound by such bylaw amendments. This Note urges future
64

Lewis claims that a dissenting shareholder can only be presumed to have assented if a business judgment, like a board’s unilateral adoption of a bylaw, maximizes the
value of a corporation. Lewis, supra note 34, at 213. She then argues that it should not
be left to the courts’ discretion to determine whether a business judgment in fact maximized the corporation’s value, and thus a court should not attempt to determine
whether a shareholder necessarily assented to a bylaw provision. Id. This argument
does not answer the question of whether a shareholder in fact assented to a bylaw provision, and the corollary question of whether there is a binding contract between the
shareholder and the board of directors. A more satisfying answer is the one I have
proposed in this Note–-that even dissenting shareholders can be said to have assented
to a bylaw amendment when that amendment was authorized in the charter to which
the shareholder did in fact assent.
65
See D EL . C ODE A NN . tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011).
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federal courts to look past the narrow contract analysis of Galaviz and
uphold forum-selection provisions in bylaw amendments. While
Galaviz may have been the first word on the subject, it is certainly not
the last.
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